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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. Case No. 8008 
JAIVIES L. HENDRICKS, \ 
Defendant. ; 
!• 
.BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Second Judicial 
District Court denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
The facts essential to this appeal are as follows: 
The defendant, James L. Hendricks, was charged in the 
Justice's Court of the North Salt Lake Precinct, before Ann 
C. Noble, Justice of the Peace, of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter, as set out in the complaint made a part of the record 
of this appeal; that preliminary hearing on said charge was 
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had before said Justice on June 6, 1952; that upon the con-
clusion of the State's case, the Justice· bound the defendant 
over to the District Court to answer to the charge of involun-
tary manslaughter. Thereafter Glenn W. Adams, District At-
torney, issued an information charging the defendant with 
the crime of involuntary manslaughter committed as follows, 
to-wit: tCThat on the 16th day of May, 1952, the defendant did 
then and there wilfully, and unlawfully, while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor but without malice, did kill the 
said Lula Blanche Jacobs, contrary· to the provisions of Title 
103, Chapter 28, Section 5, Utah Code Annotated 1943," to 
which information the defendant pleaded not guilty, and trial 
was had· before a jury in the court of Judge Parley Norseth; 
that the Judge, at the conclusion of th evidence, instructed the 
jury as to the law.governing said case. Among the instructions 
given were instructions No. 11 and No. 12, which read as 
follows: 
tCNo. 11 
tCMere negligence is not sufficient to justify a ver-
dict of involuntary manslaughter. A· driver of an auto-
. mobile is not guiJty of manslaughter just because his 
vehicle .is an instrumentality by means of which some 
one is killed. _Merely failing to see a person in time to 
a void hitting him does not, by itself, show recklessness 
or marked disregard for the s~ety of others. 
c.cso that, if you believe from the evidence in this case, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not 
driving his automobile recklessly or unlawfully or 
with a marked disregard for the safety of others~ and 
that such manner of driving was not the proxtmate 
cause of the accident, then you will not be justifietl 
in bringing in a verdict of guilty in this case." 
4 
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"No. 12 
ttYou are instructed that if you believe from the evi-
dence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant was suddenly confronted with a situa-
tion of peril which he could not avoid, then you are 
instructed to bring in a verdict of not guilty.'' 
Defendant's counsel took exception to the giving of said 
mentioned instructions 11 and 12, and each of them, on the 
ground that the same were contrary to law and shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he was not driving his automobile negligently and 
unlawfully and with a marked disregard for the safety of others, 
and that such manner of driving was not the proximate cause 
of the accident, and further shifted the burden upon the de-
fendant to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he was sud-
denly confronted with a situation of peril which he could not 
avoid. The jury returned a. verdict of guilty against said de-
fendant upon the instructions given them by the trial court; 
that thereafter and within the period fixed by law, the defend-
ant filed a motion for new trial on the ground that the court 
had misdirected the jury as a matter of law in giving each 
of the named instructions numbered 11 and 12, and on other 
grounds; that upon a hearing had on said motion, the court 
.overruled defendant's motion and sentenced the defendant 
for a term of one year in the county jail. Thereafter the court 
signed a certificate of probable cause, and this appeal was 
instituted. 
The defendant submits the question on the grounds taised 
in his motion for a new trial, on all grounds contained therein 
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except on the overruling of his motion relative to instructions 
11 and 12. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC· 
TION NO. 11, WHICH· SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO THE. DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING 
HIS AUTOMOBILE RECKLESSLY OR UNLAWFULLY OR 
WITH A MARKED DISREGARD fOR THE SAFETY OF 
OTHERS, AND SUCH ERROR IS PREJUDICIAL AND 
NOT ·CURED BY THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE COURT RELATING TO PRESUMPTIONS AND 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 12 WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN UPON 
THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH A 
SITUATION OF PERIL WHICH HE COULD NOT A VOID. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
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TION NO. 11, WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS NOT DRIVING 
HIS AUTOMOBILE RECKLESSLY OR UNLAWFULLY OR 
WITH A MARKED DISREGARD FOR THE SAFETY OF 
OTHERS, AND SUCH ERROR IS PREJUDICIAL AND 
NOT CURED BY THE GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS OF 
THE COURT RELATING TO PRESUMPTIONS AND 
BURDEN OF PROOF .. 
It is the appellant's contention that this instruction is 
contrary to law and prejudicial to his cause. The proposition 
of law relied upon is firmly established. It is elementary that 
in criminal cases the state must assume the burden of proof of 
every essential element of the crime, and prove the same be-
yond a reasonable doubt. This burden rests upon the prosecu-
tion at all stages of the trial and never shifts. An instruction 
which has the effect of ·shifting the burden· to the defendant 
to prove his innocence ttby a preponderance of the evidence," 
or tcbeyond a reasonable doubt" is error. 
Reid's Branson Instructions to Juri~s, Sec. 63 
53 Am. Jur., Trial Sec. 677 
Instruction No. 11 is complete, unambiguous and certain. 
In substance and effect it instructs the jury that the defendant 
must establish his innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
inference is that if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether 
. the defendant was driving his automobile either recklessly 
or unlawfully or with a marked disregard for the safety of 
others, then they should find the defendant guilty as charged. 
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It requires the defendant to assume the burden of proof. It 
is to be noted that reckless driving, or unlawful driving (which 
woul~ include driving while intoxicated) or driving with a 
marked disregard for the safety of others are the very facts 
which .the state must_ establish to show the commission. of the 
crime. Here the jury .is told that the defendant's evidence. must 
be. considered with the state's evidence and the issue of guilt 
resolved in favor of the defendant ·only if . his evidence is 
sufficient to dispel a reasonable doubt of his innocence. The 
jury should have been instructed that if they had a reasonable 
doubt as to whether the defendant was driving recklessly, 
or unlawfully, or with a marked disregard for the safety of 
others, then defendant ·was entitled to a verdict of not guilty. 
It is hard to conceive of a more flagrant abuse of the principle 
that a defendant in crimina~ cases is presumed innocent until 
proven guilty. 
The Ut~h court was faced with a similar problem in State 
v. Laris, 78 U. 183, 2 P (2d) 243 ( 193·1). 'In the Laris case de-
fendant's innocence turned upon the question whether he had 
received stolen heifers in go~d faith. He was convicted of lar-
ceny in the trial court, and among errors assigned for reversal 
was an instruction charging the jury that if they should find 
nfrom the evidence" that the defendant purchased and received 
the heifers in ccgood faith," then the verdict must be not guilty. 
Mr. Justice Hanson, in his opinion reversing the holding of 
the trial court, said (at page 249) ; 
CCThis instruction . . . cast upon the defendant the 
burden of establishing the good faith of the purchase. 
As the burden of proof to establish the commission of 
a crime necessarily extends to every essential element 
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of the crime, the burden is, of course, with the state 
to overcome that presumption beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 
In Hudson v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 220, 200 SW (2d) 
462 (1947), appellant, a negro boy, was charged with and 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. Deceased was a four-
year-old girl and was killed when appellant last control of his 
speeding car and drove into a private yard where she was play-
ing. The only defense submitted by the defendant was that 
the accelerator had stuck to the floorboard of his car. The 
trial court charged that if the jury believed from the evidence 1 
"to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt" that the_ killing re-
sulted otherwise than as set forth in prior instructions, then they 
must find the defendant not guilty. The Kentucky court re-
versed the conviction. In a short opinion which discussed only 
this one assignment of error, the court said (at page 463) : 
ctObjection is particularly directed at the expression 
cto the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.' The pronounce-
ments of this court have been so outstandingly ex-
plicit, unmistakable, and unambiguous about the use 
of such an expression in a defensive instruction that 
it is entirely un!_lecessary to discuss the matter at length." 
The court then said, quoting with approval from Jones v. 
Commonwealth, 213 Ky. 3~56, 281 SW 164, 166: 
" ... Clearly in defensive instructions the jury are 
only required to believe the facts upon which the in-
struction is based, and are ~ot required to believe such 
facts to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt, and it is 
prejudicial error to incorporate these words in such an 
instruction.'' 
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The use of the words ccbeyond a reasonable doubt," tcby 
a preponderance of the evidence'' and similar phrases in de-
fensive instructions has almost universally been held in error. 
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 52, 198 P (2d) ·865 
People v. Settles, 29 Cal. App. 2d 781, 78 P (2d) 274 
People v. Roberts, 122 Cal. 377, 55 P 137 
State v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 SE (2d) 658 
Vigorito v. U. S. 54 S. Ct. 3 73, 290 U.S. 705, 78 L.Ed. 
606 
Drossos v. U. S. (CCA 8th Cir.) 2 F.2d 538 
·collins v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky. 572, 218 SW (2d) 
393 
Brewer v. State, 143 Tex. Ct. App. 136, 157 SW (2d) 
388 
Lively v. State, 150 Tex. Ct. App. 485, 202 SW (2d) 
850 
Miner v. U.S. (CCA lOth Cir) 57 F. 2d 506 
Johnson v. State, 1.05 Texas Ct. App. 811, 20 SW (2d) 
832 
The appellant concedes that where individual instructions 
are to be interpreted, they must be considered in the light of 
the whole context and that it is not proper to isolate one or 
two instructions. If other instructions are given which clarify 
an ambiguity, or supply an omission, or make certain an un-
certainty, then the instruction may not be complained of as 
prejudicial. Thus in State v. Green, 86 U. 192, 40 P (2d) 961, 
the court held that a questionable instruction was cured. In 
the Green case defendant pleaded insanity to a charge of first 
degree murder. The trial court instructed that such a defense 
was proper and legitimate ccif proved." In commenting upon 
the instructio~, Mr. Chief Justice Hanson wrote (at page 964): 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nThe use of the words tif proved' in that instruction 
is not free from objection, but, in ligpt of the fact that 
in a number of other instructions the court repeatedly 
informed the jury that the defendant was entitled to 
an acquittal if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt 
as to his sanity at the time in question, we are unable 
to perceive how the jury could have been misled by 
the objectionable language." 
It is to be noted, however, that in the Green case the clarifying 
instructions were directed specifically to the subject matter 
of the erroneous instruction. The rule is not the same where a . 
general instruction is relied upon to cure an erroneous one. 
It is a common rule of construction that where a general and 
a specific passage conflict, the more specific or particular pass~ 
age should be followed. Hence, where the specific instruction 
is the erroneous one, it is not only impossible to tell which of 
the instructions, general or specific,· the jury followed in their 
deliberations, . but the presumption would be that the jury 
followed the erroneous specific instruction. In the first appeal 
of the Green case, State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P (2d) 177 
( 1931), the Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. 
In explaining the rule with respect to conflicting instructions, 
the court quoted with approval from Jensen v. Utah RR Co., 
72 U. 366, 270 P 349, 355 (at page 183): 
and 
H ••• where instructions are in irreconcilable con-
flict, or so conflicting as to confuse or misiead the jury, 
the rule requiring instructions to be read together has 
no application." 
t' . . . the giving of inconsistent instructions is error 
and sufficient ground for reversal of the judgment, 
because, after verdict, it cannot be told which instruc-
11 
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tion was -followed by the jury, or what influence the 
erroneous instruction had on their deliberations . . . " 
This same line of reasoning was employed in State v. W aid, 
92 U. 297, 67 P (2d) 647, where the court gathered the con-
trolling Utah cases on the question. 
A case similar to the present one is Drossos v. United 
States, 2 F 2d 538 (CCA 8th Cir.) This was an appeal from a 
conviction in the Federal District Court of Utah. The district 
court charged the jury, ((if you are convinced by the evidence 
introduced in behalf of the defendant, then you should ac-
quit .... " ·The respondent relied upon a general instruction 
which properly charged the jury as to the presumption of inno-
cence and burden of proof. In reversing the conviction, the 
court said (at page 5 39) : 
ttlt is of course also true, and well settled by the 
authorities, that a charge to a jury is to be considered 
as a whole, and that if the instructions as a series cor-
rectly state the law, then though one paragraph or one 
phrase st~nding alone may be defective, it will not 
constitute reversible error. · But that is not the rule 
where two instructions are directly in conflict and one 
of them clearly erroneous and prejudicial, such as is 
presented here, for the jury will assume that the in-
structions are all correct and will as likely follow the 
incorrect as the correct instruction." (Citing authori-
ties). 
This part of the opinion was cited with approval by our Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Laris, 78 U. 183, 2 P (2d) 243, 249 . 
. Perhaps the most recently reported case in point is State 
12 
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v. Cummings, ---- N.M. ____ , 253 P (2d) 321 (Jan. 28, 1953). 
In this case defendant was convicted of involuntry manslaugh-
ter. There was testimony to the effect that defendant at the 
time of the accident was driving at an excessive rate of speed 
and that he was intoxicated. The trial court instructed the jury 
that if they should· find ((after a fair preponderance of the 
evidence'' that the defendant was driving at an excessive rate 
of speed and while drunk, then they would be warranted in find-
ing a verdict of guilty. The Supreme Court ruled that this 
instruction was calculated to confuse and mislead the jury and 
was uhurtful" to the defendant. Judgment was reversed and 
the cause remanded for a new trial. The court said, at page 
322, quoting from State v. Crosby, 26 N.M. 3t18, 191 P 1079, 
1081: 
uw e believe the proper rule to be that error com-
mitted in giving an incorrect instruction is not cured or 
rendered harmless by the giving of a correct instruction 
on the same subject, and this rule. should be applied 
in the present case, in which the erroneous instruction 
was complete, unambiguous, and certain." 
A search has revealed no significant cases in which an -in- . 
struction which shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt facts · which if proved 
would negative guilt, has been cured by a general instruction 
of the court on the proper rule of burden of proof. See: 
People v. Roe, 189 Cal. _548, 209 P 560; 
People ·v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2nd 52, 198 P (2d) 865; 
Nicola v. United States, 72 F 2d 78 (CCA) 3rd Cir.); 
State v. Floyd, 220 N.C. 530, 17 SE (2d) 658; 
Orlando v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 836, 292 SW 497. 
13 
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II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 12 WHICH SHIFTED THE BURDEN UPON 
THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH A 
SITUATION OF PERIL WHICH HE COULD NOT A \'010. 
Appellant contends that this instruction was calculated 
to confuse and mislead the jury. The propositions of law 
elicited in the argument of Assignment of Error No. I render 
an instruction such as this not only erroneous and prejudicial, 
but contrary to a basic principle of American criminal law 
(i.e., the presumption of innocence attending the defendant at 
all stages of the trial). 
It is submitted that evidence of weather conditions, me-
·chanical condition of the windshield wiper of appellant's auto-
mobile, and the fact that apparently neither the deceased nor 
appellant saw each other in time to avoid the collision and that 
in fact no attempt was made to avoid such collision, may all 
have contributed to raising a reasonable doubt in the minds 
of the jury as to the defendant's guilt, in which case he should 
have been acquitt~d. The effect of Instruction No. 12 is to make 
it incumbent upon appellant to affirmatively show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that he was confronted with such a situation 
of peril. Here again the presumption as to defendant's inno-
cence is improperly resolved in favor of the state. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 given by the 
1 ,j 
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trial court shifted the burden to the defendant to prove his 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Such instructions were 
prejudicial to the defendant, and they were not cured by the 
general instructions given by the court on reasonable doubt. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the conviction should 
be set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT MACFARLANE 
Attorney for Appellant 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.~ ~:.-veils/·.~-~-· 
r·~ ( j ~. 
(' 
./ 
•,. 
)·· 
·~-
' 
~,·'~·, 
. \ 
.., 
;~· }:.~·~ ~· ,, ' 
·f., •' 
.; ' 
•. I 
i . 
. ' 
\ ' ~ .. •·. 
~:~;:~t ·~' 
"' 
I • 
.,, l' .-".·\. 
·;(~-
• 1 M~ 
' ~\ 
.,. 
'"\. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
